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The process of scientific
publication, through which new findings are reviewed for quality and
then presented to the rest of the scientific community and the public,
is a vital element in our national life. New discoveries reported in
research papers have helped improve the human condition in myriad ways:
protecting public health, multiplying agricultural yields, fostering
technological development and economic growth, and enhancing global
stability and security.
But new science, as we know, may sometimes have costs as well as
benefits. The prospect that weapons of mass destruction might find
their way into the hands of terrorists did not suddenly appear on
September 11, 2001. A policy focus on nuclear proliferation, no
stranger to the physics community, has been with us for many years. But
the events of September 11 brought a new understanding of the urgency
of dealing with terrorism. And the subsequent harmful use of infectious
agents brought a new set of issues to the life sciences. As a result,
questions have been asked by the scientists themselves and by some
political leaders about the possibility that new information published
in research journals might give aid to those with malevolent ends.
Journals that dealt especially with microbiology, infectious agents,
public health, and plant and agricultural systems faced these issues
earlier than some others, and have attempted to deal with them. The
American Society for Microbiology (ASM), in particular, urged the
National Academy of Sciences to take an active role in organizing a
meeting of publishers, scientists, security experts, and government
officials to explore the issues and discuss what steps might be taken
to resolve them. In a one-day workshop at the Academy in Washington,
DC, cohosted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies on
January 9, 2003, an open forum was held for that purpose. A day later,
a group of journal editors, augmented by scientist-authors, government
officials, and others, held a separate meeting designed to explore
possible approaches.
What follows reflects some outcomes of that preliminary discussion.
Fundamental is a view, shared by nearly all, that there is information
that, although we cannot now capture it with lists or definitions,
presents enough risk of use by terrorists that it should not be
published. How and by what processes it might be identified will
continue to challenge us, because, as all present acknowledged, it is
also true that open publication brings benefits not only to public
health but also to efforts to combat terrorism.
FIRST: The scientific information published in peer-reviewed
research journals carries special status and confers unique
responsibilities on editors and authors. We must protect the integrity
of the scientific process by publishing manuscripts of high quality, in
sufficient detail to permit reproducibility. Without independent
verification, a requirement for scientific progress, we can neither
advance biomedical research nor provide the knowledge base for building strong biodefense systems.
SECOND: We recognize that the prospect of bioterrorism has raised
legitimate concerns about the potential abuse of published information,
but also recognize that research in the very same fields will be
critical to society in meeting the challenges of defense. We are
committed to dealing responsibly and effectively with safety and
security issues that may be raised by papers submitted for publication,
and to increasing our capacity to identify such issues as they arise.
THIRD: Scientists and their journals should consider the appropriate
level and design of processes to accomplish effective review of papers
that raise such security issues. Journals in disciplines that have
attracted numbers of such papers have already devised procedures that
might be employed as models in considering process design. Some of us
represent some of those journals; others among us are committed to the
timely implementation of such processes, about which we will notify our
readers and authors.
FOURTH: We recognize that on occasion an editor may conclude that the
potential harm of publication outweighs the potential societal
benefits. Under such circumstances, the paper should be modified or not
be published. Scientific information is also communicated by other
means: seminars, meetings, electronic posting, etc. Journals and
scientific societies can play an important role in encouraging
investigators to communicate results of research in ways that maximize
public benefits and minimize risks of misuse.
*
Group members: Ronald Atlas, President, ASM, and Editor,
CRC Critical Reviews in Microbiology; Philip Campbell,
Editor, Nature; Nicholas R. Cozzarelli, Editor, PNAS;
Greg Curfman, Deputy Editor, New England Journal of
Medicine; Lynn Enquist, Editor, Journal of
Virology; Gerald Fink, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Annette Flanagin, Managing Senior Editor, Journal of the
American Medical Association, and President, Council of Science
Editors; Jacqueline Fletcher, President, American Phytopathological
Society; Elizabeth George, Program Manager, National Nuclear Security
Administration, Department of Energy; Gordon Hammes, Editor,
Biochemistry; David Heyman, Senior Fellow and Director
of Science and Security Initiatives, Center for Strategic and
International Studies; Thomas Inglesby, Editor, Biosecurity and
Bioterrorism; Samuel Kaplan, Chair, ASM Publications Board;
Donald Kennedy, Editor, Science; Judith Krug, Director,
Office for Intellectual Freedom, American Library Association; Rachel
E. Levinson, Assistant Director for Life Sciences, Office of Science
and Technology Policy; Emilie Marcus, Editor, Neuron; Henry Metzger, National Institute of Arthritis and Musculoskeletal and
Skin Diseases, National Institutes of Health; Stephen S. Morse, Columbia University; Alison O'Brien, Editor, Infection and
Immunity; Andrew Onderdonk, Editor, Journal of Clinical
Microbiology; George Poste, Chief Executive Officer, Health
Technology Networks; Beatrice Renault, Editor, Nature
Medicine; Robert Rich, Editor, Journal of
Immunology; Ariella Rosengard, University of Pennsylvania; Steven Salzburg, The Institute for Genome Research; Mary Scanlan, Director, Publishing Operations, American Chemical Society; Thomas Shenk, President Elect, ASM, and Past Editor, Journal of
Virology; Herbert Tabor, Editor, Journal of Biological
Chemistry; Harold Varmus, Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer
Center; Eckard Wimmer, State University of New York at Stony
Brook; Keith Yamamoto, Editor, Molecular Biology of the
Cell.
www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.0630491100
Editorial
Uncensored exchange of scientific results
The statements follow:
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Introduction
The statements follow:
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