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Vol. 95, Issue 22, 13301-13306, October 27, 1998
Department of Neurobiology, Box 3209, Duke University Medical
Center, Durham, NC 27710
Contributed by Dale Purves, August 28, 1998
In this second part of our study on the mechanism of perceived
brightness, we explore the effects of manipulating three-dimensional geometry. The additional scenes portrayed here demonstrate that the
same luminance profile can elicit different sensations of brightness as
a function of how the objects in the scene are arranged in space. This
further evidence confirms the implication of the scenes presented in
the accompanying paper, namely that sensations of relative
brightness The cues about shadow and light in the accompanying paper
(1) relied on implications about the illumination of a two-dimensional object (the surface of a card, or a billboard). Such depictions are
limited by the fact that a variety of contrast relationships in the
scene must be changed to achieve the desired graphical effects, albeit
not in the immediate vicinity of the test diamonds. Thus, the regions
depicted as being shadowed or lit in the scenes already presented
required the introduction of large areas in which the gray scale values
are altered (thus changing the "surrounds of the surrounds"), or,
in the case of penumbras, changing the contrast boundary itself. We
therefore devised another type of graphic in which the depiction of a
three-dimensional object instead of a two-dimensional one allowed cues
about illumination to be introduced with few, and ultimately no,
changes in the configuration of the luminance profiles being compared.
The methods here are the same as those previously described (1).
The dimensions and gray scale values in the additional scenes presented
in this part of the study are given in Fig.
1.
Neurobiology
An empirical explanation of brightness
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ABSTRACT
Top
Abstract
Introduction
Procedures
Results
Discussion
Conclusions
References
including standard demonstrations of simultaneous brightness contrast
cannot arise by computations of local contrast. The most plausible explanation of the full range of perceptual phenomena we have described is an empirical strategy that links the
luminance profile in a visual stimulus with an association (the
percept) that represents the profile's most probable real-world source.
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INTRODUCTION
Top
Abstract
Introduction
Procedures
Results
Discussion
Conclusions
References
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EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES
Top
Abstract
Introduction
Procedures
Results
Discussion
Conclusions
References

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Fig. 1.
The dimensions (in degrees) of the various
elements and their respective gray scale values (0-255) in the
three-dimensional scenes presented in this component of the study.
(A) Cube scene (see Fig. 2). (B) Rotated cube
scene (see Fig. 3).
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RESULTS |
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Use of Three-Dimensional Geometry To Alter Apparent Illumination. Fig. 2 presents the test diamonds and their surrounds on the faces of cubes depicted as being illuminated from a source at the upper right. As in the card and billboard figures, marked differences in the apparent brightness of the test diamonds are elicited by this alternative means of indicating whether a test diamond and its surround lie in light or shadow (compare the appearance of the test diamond on the cube in the foregrounds in Fig. 2 A and B). The average difference in perceived brightness of the diamonds when the dark surround and its diamond were depicted in shadow and the light surround in light (Fig. 2A) compared with the reversed depiction (Fig. 2B) was 124% (Fig. 2C). The only change used to elicit this marked difference in the perceived brightness of the equiluminant test diamonds is switching the position of the relevant faces of the cube from an apparently lighted region of the scene to a region in apparent shadow.
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Change in Perceived Brightness of Test Patches When Altered Direction of Illumination Is Only Implied. Despite this demonstration, it might be argued that the perceptual differences measured in Fig. 2C are still related to contrast differences that, in this case, arise from repositioning the light surround in Fig. 2A next to the shadow of the cube in Fig. 2B (and vice versa). To counter this objection, we devised yet another graphic that avoids this problem. In Fig. 3, the direction of the illumination is not specified by shadowing, as it is in Fig. 2. Rather, the graphic takes advantage of the fact that, because illumination from the sun or other sources is usually from above, observers assume a superior light source in the absence of other cues (see, for example, ref. 2). In this depiction, the two stimuli differ only in their orientation (compare Fig. 3 A and B). Even in this presentation, the average perceived difference in brightness elicited by the two equiluminant test patches was 65% (Fig. 3C). A large difference in perceived brightness elicited by exactly the same luminance profile in distinct orientations has, to our knowledge, not been described.
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DISCUSSION |
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The results summarized in Tables 1 and 2 show that the apparent brightness of equiluminant test objects varies greatly as a function of how their illumination is portrayed. The absence of differences in local contrast in the graphics we used, culminating with the remarkable demonstration in Fig. 3, makes it difficult to rationalize these perceptual phenomena in terms of the opposing center-surround organization of the receptive fields of retinal, thalamic, or primary visual cortical neurons. Our account of the results up to this point does not, however, indicate (i) how these perceptual phenomena are best explained; (ii) what their significance is for understanding textbook demonstrations of simultaneous brightness contrast (Fig. 4A, for example); or (iii) their implications for visual perception more generally. The remainder of the discussion is devoted to these issues.
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An Explanation Based on the Statistics of Visual Experience. If lateral interactions among lower order visual neurons cannot easily account for these effects, what, then, does? The alternative explanation implied by the perceptual phenomena we report is that the relative brightnesses of the elements in a visual stimulus are empirical associations elicited by the full gamut of luminance relationships in the scene. In this conception, it is not local contrast that causes differences in the brightness of the test patches, but what the test patch luminance in the context of the luminances in the rest of the scene has most often signified. For example, if two objects return the same amount of light to the eye when one is in shadow and the other is not (see Fig. 4C), the one in shadow will, empirically, always have returned more light to the eye when the objects are viewed together in the same illumination. If these percepts are generated as associations elicited by the statistical implications of the luminance profiles in visual stimuli, then this fact about luminance relationships will bias what is seen, causing the test patch in shadow to look brighter than the test patch that is unshadowed. Similarly, an object lying in a region of local illumination (see Fig. 4D) always will have returned less light to the eye when compared with an equiluminant object that is not locally lit. By the same argument, the test patch in light will tend to look dimmer than the test patch not within the region of local illumination.
Explanation of the Standard Simultaneous Brightness Contrast Illusion. How, then, can such reasoning account for the perceptions elicited by the standard presentation of simultaneous brightness contrast, in which two equiluminant test objects are presented on different backgrounds in the absence of any obvious scene or cues that convey information about illumination (see Fig. 4A)? The explanation we propose, as in the argument put forward to explain the effects of depicted shadow and light, is predicated on the statistical significance of the luminance profiles involved. In the absence of more specific cues, the "scene" in the standard presentation of the simultaneous brightness contrast illusion could represent any of the possibilities illustrated in Fig. 4B-E (i.e., an evenly illuminated two-dimensional object with different surface properties, as in Fig. 4B; a surface on which the dark portion is generated by a shadow, as in Fig. 4C; a surface on which the light region is generated by local illumination, as in Fig. 4D; or the additional possibilities that would arise from the three-dimensionality of objects, as in Fig. 4E). The stimulus in Fig. 4A also could represent a scene in which the lighter surround actually lies in shadow or in which the dark surface lies in local illumination (see Figs. 4 and 5 in the accompanying paper). In short, this stimulus is deeply ambiguous with respect to the meaning of the luminances portrayed.
An expedient
and perhaps the only
way to cope with this
ambiguity (which is, to a greater or lesser degree, present in all of
the graphics we have used, and indeed in all scenes) would be to
generate the perception of Fig. 4A empirically, based
on what a particular luminance profile most often has signified. To our
knowledge, statistical information about the meanings of luminance
profiles in representative visual scenes has not been determined.
Despite this ignorance, it is certain that the dark and light surrounds
in Fig. 4A will not have always represented a surface
reflectance boundary in an evenly illuminated scene (e.g., Fig.
4B), the only circumstance in which the equiluminant test
diamonds actually would represent equiluminant objects. On the
contrary, as indicated in Fig. 4, the stimulus often will have arisen
from one of a variety of other possibilities generated by shadow,
light, the configuration of objects in the third dimension, and other
factors not considered here (such as inherent luminosity). We therefore
suggest that the stimulus in Fig. 4A is seen not as
the luminance profile that it actually represents but as an association
determined both by learning and whatever phylogenetic biases have been
built into the visual system by the experience of the species. Regarded
in this way, the brightness relationships seen in Fig.
4A are no more nor less illusory than the perception of the other stimuli in Fig. 4 or indeed of any visual stimulus.
Broader Significance of an Empirical Basis for Perception. The statistical strategy that we propose to account for the perception of relative brightness is arguably similar to the strategy for perceiving at least some other aspects of visual stimuli. For example, minimal cues about the form of ambiguous objects have long been known to compel the perception of particular spatial relationships (reviewed in ref. 2). Thus, Fig. 5 shows a stimulus that is seen as a stair by most observers. In fact, the diagram (the so-called Schroeder stair) equally well represents an overhanging cornice, as can be seen by turning the figure upside down. Observers presumably see a stair rather than a cornice because this set of lines and angles has signified a stair much more often than a descending overhang. The association elicited by the stimulus therefore is biased heavily toward a stair by the statistics of what the stimulus usually has meant.
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brightness and form
raises the
possibility that the visual system generally is organized to elaborate
percepts on a statistical basis rather than by computations that
directly inform us about the properties of a visual stimulus.
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CONCLUSIONS |
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The idea that experience can affect visual perception is, of course, not new. The most notable proponent of this theme has been Helmholtz, who argued persuasively in the 19th century that many aspects of what we see are influenced by what he called "unconscious inference" (3). With respect to brightness perception, his ideas are described in volume II of his monograph on vision (ref. 2, pp. 264-300). In this century, further experiments on the influence of experience on the perception of brightness have been reviewed thoroughly by Evans (4), Beck (5), and Hurvich (6). The upshot of this work has been the view that perception is "a prologue to learning," providing a "representation" that subsequently allows "inferences about associations" to be made (7). Neither Helmholtz nor his successors suggested that the phenomenology of simultaneous brightness contrast points to a more fundamental strategy in visual perception, namely to have visual stimuli elicit in a probabilistic manner associations that are themselves the percepts we experience.
The "errors" in the perception of brightness that arise in the exercise of this probabilistic process are counterbalanced by the enormous value of this strategy of perception. Thus, a scheme of perception based on empirically determined probabilities insures that a given stimulus always elicits a pattern of neural activity (the percept) that represents the most frequently encountered real-world source of the stimulus. In the face of the many uncertainties that the visual world routinely presents, this statistical mechanism may be the best way to disambiguate scenes and thus to guarantee appropriate behavior (which provides the feedback that motivates this process). Although an observer perceiving luminance or other visual relationships on this basis only rarely will see objects that precisely accord with the measured values of the stimulus, the "misperceptions" that ensue are trivial compared with the benefit of always seeing visual stimuli as the scenes they are most likely to represent.
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS |
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We are grateful to Tim Andrews, David Coppola, David Fitzpatrick, Beau Lotto, Tom Polger, Len White, and Oren Yishai for helpful criticisms. This work was supported by National Institutes of Health Grant NS29187.
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FOOTNOTES |
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* To whom reprint requests should be addressed. e-mail: purves{at}neuro.duke.edu.
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REFERENCES |
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| 1. |
Williams, S. M., McCoy, A. N. & Purves, D.
(1998)
Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA
95,
13296-13300
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| 2. | Rock, I. (1995) Perception (Scientific American Library, New York). |
| 3. |
von Helmholtz, H. L. F.
(1911)
Helmholtz's Treatise on Physiological Optics
(Verlag um Leopold Voss, Hamburg, Germany); transl. Southall, J. P. C. (1924) (George Banta, Menasha, WI), Vols. I III (German).
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| 4. | Evans, R. M. (1948) An Introduction to Color (John Wiley, New York). |
| 5. | Beck, J. (1972) Surface Color Perception (Cornell Univ. Press, Ithaca). |
| 6. | Hurvich, L. M. (1981) Color Vision (Sinauer, Sunderland, MA). |
| 7. | Barlow, H. (1990) Vision Res. 30, 1561-1571 [CrossRef][ISI][Medline] . |
Copyright © 1998 by The National Academy of Sciences 0027-8424/98/9513301-6$2.00/0
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