Belief in free will affects causal attributions when judging others’ behavior

Oliver Genschow; Davide Rigoni; Marcel Brass

doi:10.1073/pnas.1701916114

New Research In

Edited by Jonathan W. Schooler, University of California, Santa Barbara, CA, and accepted by Editorial Board Member Michael S. Gazzaniga June 19, 2017 (received for review February 3, 2017)

Significance

The question whether free will exists or not has been a matter of debate in philosophy for centuries. Recently, researchers claimed that free will is nothing more than a myth. Although the validity of this claim is debatable, it attracted much attention in the general public. This raises the crucial question whether it matters if people believe in free will or not. In six studies, we tested whether believing in free will is related to the correspondence bias—that is, people’s automatic tendency to overestimate the influence of internal as compared to external factors when interpreting others’ behavior. Overall, we demonstrate that believing in free will increases the correspondence bias and predicts prescribed punishment and reward behavior.

Abstract

Free will is a cornerstone of our society, and psychological research demonstrates that questioning its existence impacts social behavior. In six studies, we tested whether believing in free will is related to the correspondence bias, which reflects people’s automatic tendency to overestimate the influence of internal as compared to external factors when interpreting others’ behavior. All studies demonstrate a positive relationship between the strength of the belief in free will and the correspondence bias. Moreover, in two experimental studies, we showed that weakening participants’ belief in free will leads to a reduction of the correspondence bias. Finally, the last study demonstrates that believing in free will predicts prescribed punishment and reward behavior, and that this relation is mediated by the correspondence bias. Overall, these studies show that believing in free will impacts fundamental social-cognitive processes that are involved in the understanding of others’ behavior.

Footnotes

↵¹To whom correspondence should be addressed. Email: oliver.genschow{at}uni-koeln.de.

Author contributions: O.G., D.R., and M.B. designed research; O.G. and D.R. performed research; O.G. and D.R. analyzed data; and O.G., D.R., and M.B. wrote the paper.
The authors declare no conflict of interest.
This article is a PNAS Direct Submission. J.W.S. is a guest editor invited by the Editorial Board.
This article contains supporting information online at www.pnas.org/lookup/suppl/doi:10.1073/pnas.1701916114/-/DCSupplemental.

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