Statistical detection of systematic election irregularities
- aSection for Science of Complex Systems, Medical University of Vienna, A-1090 Vienna, Austria;
- bInstitut für Betriebswirtschaftslehre, University of Vienna, 1210 Vienna, Austria;
- cSanta Fe Institute, Santa Fe, NM 87501; and
- dInternational Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, A-2361 Laxenburg, Austria
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Edited by Stephen E. Fienberg, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA, and approved August 16, 2012 (received for review June 27, 2012)

Abstract
Democratic societies are built around the principle of free and fair elections, and that each citizen’s vote should count equally. National elections can be regarded as large-scale social experiments, where people are grouped into usually large numbers of electoral districts and vote according to their preferences. The large number of samples implies statistical consequences for the polling results, which can be used to identify election irregularities. Using a suitable data representation, we find that vote distributions of elections with alleged fraud show a kurtosis substantially exceeding the kurtosis of normal elections, depending on the level of data aggregation. As an example, we show that reported irregularities in recent Russian elections are, indeed, well-explained by systematic ballot stuffing. We develop a parametric model quantifying the extent to which fraudulent mechanisms are present. We formulate a parametric test detecting these statistical properties in election results. Remarkably, this technique produces robust outcomes with respect to the resolution of the data and therefore, allows for cross-country comparisons.
Footnotes
- ↵1To whom correspondence should be addressed. E-mail: stefan.thurner{at}meduniwien.ac.at.
Author contributions: P.K., Y.Y., R.H., and S.T. designed research, performed research, contributed new reagents/analytic tools, analyzed data, and wrote the paper.
The authors declare no conflict of interest.
This article is a PNAS Direct Submission.
This article contains supporting information online at www.pnas.org/lookup/suppl/doi:10.1073/pnas.1210722109/-/DCSupplemental.
Freely available online through the PNAS open access option.














