The effects of reputational and social knowledge on cooperation
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Edited by Martin A. Nowak, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, and accepted by the Editorial Board February 5, 2015 (received for review August 18, 2014)

Significance
Cooperation is essential for societies to prosper. Recent experiments show that cooperation emerges in dynamic networks in which subjects can select their connections. However, these studies fixed the amount of reputation information available and did not display the network to subjects. Here, we systematically vary the knowledge available to subjects about reputation and the network to investigate experimentally their roles in determining cooperation in dynamic networks. Common knowledge about everyone’s reputation is the main driver of cooperation leading to dense and clustered networks. The addition of common knowledge about the network affects the distribution of cooperative activity: cooperators form a separate community and achieve a higher payoff from within-community interactions than members of the less cooperative community.
Abstract
The emergence and sustenance of cooperative behavior is fundamental for a society to thrive. Recent experimental studies have shown that cooperation increases in dynamic networks in which subjects can choose their partners. However, these studies did not vary reputational knowledge, or what subjects know about other’s past actions, which has long been recognized as an important factor in supporting cooperation. They also did not give subjects access to global social knowledge, or information on who is connected to whom in the group. As a result, it remained unknown how reputational and social knowledge foster cooperative behavior in dynamic networks both independently and by complementing each other. In an experimental setting, we show that global reputational knowledge is crucial to sustaining a high level of cooperation and welfare. Cooperation is associated with the emergence of dense and clustered networks with highly cooperative hubs. Global social knowledge has no effect on the aggregate level of cooperation. A community analysis shows that the addition of global social knowledge to global reputational knowledge affects the distribution of cooperative activity: cooperators form a separate community that achieves a higher cooperation level than the community of defectors. Members of the community of cooperators achieve a higher payoff from interactions within the community than members of the less cooperative community.
Footnotes
↵1E.G. and C.Y. contributed equally to this work.
- ↵2To whom correspondence may be addressed. Email: edo{at}econ.cam.ac.uk or chang.yan{at}cs.ox.ac.uk.
Author contributions: E.G. and C.Y. designed research, performed research, analyzed data, and wrote the paper.
The authors declare no conflict of interest.
This article is a PNAS Direct Submission. M.A.N. is a guest editor invited by the Editorial Board.
This article contains supporting information online at www.pnas.org/lookup/suppl/doi:10.1073/pnas.1415883112/-/DCSupplemental.