Income inequality in today’s China

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Using multiple data sources, we establish that China’s income inequality since 2005 has reached very high levels, with the Gini coefficient in the range of 0.53–0.55. Analyzing comparable survey data collected in 2010 in China and the United States, we examine social determinants that help explain China’s high income inequality. Our results indicate that a substantial part of China’s high income inequality is due to regional disparities and the rural-urban gap. The contributions of these two structural forces are particularly strong in China, but they play a negligible role in generating the overall income inequality in the United States, where individual-level and family-level income determinants, such as family structure and race/ethnicity, play a much larger role.

Since its beginning in 1978, China’s economic reform has led not only to rapid economic growth but also to a large increase in economic inequality. Although scholars continue to debate about precise estimates (1), the consensus is that income inequality in China has now reached a level much higher than that in the United States (2). As we will discuss below, the Gini coefficient for family income in China has now reached a level above 0.5, compared with 0.45 in the United States in 2010. This finding is significant because China had a very low level of income inequality as recently as in the late 1980s (3). Ordinary persons in China know about this increase, as they have personally experienced it in their own lives (4). Although ordinary Chinese people seem to tolerate the high inequality (4–6), they also recognize it as a social problem needing to be addressed. In fact, out of a number of social issues given, respondents in a 2012 national survey rated economic inequality (more precisely, the “rich-poor gap”) the most severe, above corruption and unemployment (7).

In this paper, we wish to address two research questions. (i) How high is income inequality in today’s China? (ii) Why is it so high? The first question appears to be a simple fact that could be answered by government statistics. Unfortunately, this is not true for China. For a variety of complicated reasons, ranging from politics to practical difficulties, government statistics on Chinese well-being have been questioned for their accuracy (8). This concern is exacerbated by the long-standing concealment practices of China’s National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), responsible for constructing and releasing government data on China, such that no original microlevel data are accessible to any independent researcher that could be used to corroborate the macrolevel statistics it releases. In the case of income inequality, the NBS stopped releasing the Gini coefficient after it reached 0.41 in 2000 (8). It was not until an economist claimed that the Gini coefficient had reached the shockingly high level of 0.61 that the NBS, in early 2013, released the Gini coefficients for recent years, which were slightly under 0.5 (2, 9). What is the true level of income inequality in today’s China? Scholars continually and heatedly debate this question (1). In this paper, we contribute to this debate by computing estimates of the Gini coefficient using seven newly available nationally representative surveys, including microlevel data from a very large survey conducted by the NBS in 2005. The other six surveys were independently conducted by four university-affiliated survey organizations with a transparent sampling framework. We use data from these seven sources to estimate Gini coefficients for recent years and compare them both with those in China’s past and those in other countries, particularly the United States.

The second objective of this paper is to explain why income inequality by international standards is so high in today’s China. Past research has exclusively focused on the contributions of income components and determinants of temporal changes in China’s overall income inequality (3, 10, 11). If we wish to understand why China’s inequality is so high, however, we need to know what special features of the Chinese context might account for the inequality. With this goal in mind, we adopt a different research strategy and compare today’s China not with its own past but with another large, important, and well-studied country with a high level of economic inequality—the United States. In the last 20 y, the United States has also experienced increasing economic inequality (12), but the increase in the United States has been much smaller than that in China. In this paper, we focus on two nationally representative surveys in 2010 and compare five determinants of income inequality between China and the United States. We test a hypothesis proposed by both Xie (13) and Wang (14) that China’s current high income inequality is heavily driven by structural forces attributable to the Chinese political system, most notably the urban-rural gap and the regional variation in economic wellbeing.

Data

For our main analyses throughout this paper, we focus on the 2010 baseline survey of the China Family Panel Studies (hereafter CFPS 2010). The 2010 survey of the CFPS is the baseline wave of a large-scale, almost nationally representative panel survey project conducted by the Institute of Social Science Survey at Peking University (extensive information about the survey can be found at www.isss.edu.cn/cfps/). The 25 provinces of China (excluding Inner Mongolia, Xinjiang, Tibet, Hainan, Ningxia, and Qinghai) covered by the CFPS represent about 95% of the Chinese population in mainland China (15). Through a multistage probability sampling procedure, this survey completed interviews with...
14,798 sampled households and all individuals living in these households. For each family, a list of questions were asked to solicit information on labor income, business income, investment income, transfer income, and income from other sources, from which we constructed total family income as our variable of interest. To cross-validate the level of income inequality in today’s China, we also calculated Gini coefficients of family income from six additional data sources: the China 2005 1% Population Intercensus Survey (also called the 2005 mini-census, hereafter Mini-Census 2005), the 2010 and 2012 Chinese General Social Surveys (CGSS 2010 and CGSS 2012), the 2011 Chinese Household Finance Survey (CHFS 2011), the 2012 baseline wave of the China Labor Force Dynamic Survey (CLDS 2012), and the 2012 wave of the China Family Panel Studies (CFPS 2012). Detailed information about these surveys is provided in SI Text. In calculating the Gini coefficients, we excluded small proportions of families who did not report a positive income. Table 1 summarizes these data sets, with organization name, sample coverage, sample size, measure of family income, and estimated Gini coefficients. In particular, we also report Gini coefficients with purchasing power parity (PPP) adjustment that control for differences in cost of living between rural and urban areas and across provinces (see Table S1 for more details). For comparability with data from other countries, we use unadjusted Gini coefficients for the remainder of the paper.

Table 1. Seven recently collected, nationally representative survey data sets in China and the corresponding estimates of the Gini coefficient

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Data source</th>
<th>Name of organization</th>
<th>Coverage of provinces</th>
<th>Sample size (no. families)</th>
<th>No. families with positive income</th>
<th>Measure of income</th>
<th>Gini coefficient (without PPP adjustment)</th>
<th>Gini coefficient (with PPP adjustment)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mini-Census 2005</td>
<td>National Bureau of Statistics of China</td>
<td>All 31 provinces of Mainland China</td>
<td>973,159</td>
<td>779,849</td>
<td>Sum of each family member’s self-reported monthly income multiplied by 12</td>
<td>0.483 (0.496)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CGSS 2010</td>
<td>Renmin University of China and the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology</td>
<td>All 31 provinces of Mainland China</td>
<td>11,785</td>
<td>10,260</td>
<td>Self-reported total family income in 2009</td>
<td>0.545</td>
<td>0.518</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CGSS 2012</td>
<td>Same as above</td>
<td>29 provinces of Mainland China (excluding Tibet and Hainan)</td>
<td>11,765</td>
<td>10,326</td>
<td>Self-reported total family income in 2011</td>
<td>0.539 (0.563)</td>
<td>0.515 (0.537)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFPS 2010</td>
<td>Peking University</td>
<td>25 provinces of Mainland China (excluding Inner Mongolia, Xinjiang, Tibet, Hainan, Ningxia, Qinghai)</td>
<td>14,798</td>
<td>13,837</td>
<td>Total family income in 2009 from all sources</td>
<td>0.530 (0.541)</td>
<td>0.517 (0.525)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFPS 2012</td>
<td>Same as above</td>
<td>Same as above</td>
<td>13,316</td>
<td>11,785</td>
<td>Total family income in 2011 from all sources</td>
<td>0.532 (0.526)</td>
<td>0.526 (0.517)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHFS 2011</td>
<td>Southwestern University of Finance and Economics</td>
<td>25 provinces of Mainland China (excluding Inner Mongolia, Xinjiang, Tibet, Hainan, Ningxia, Fujian)</td>
<td>8,438</td>
<td>8,092</td>
<td>Total family income in 2010 from all sources</td>
<td>0.611 (0.633)</td>
<td>0.588 (0.609)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CLDS 2012</td>
<td>Sun Yat-sen University</td>
<td>28 provinces of Mainland China (excluding Tibet, Chongqing and Hainan)</td>
<td>10,612</td>
<td>9,735</td>
<td>Self-reported total family income in 2011</td>
<td>0.536</td>
<td>0.531</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For CFPS 2010, CFPS 2012, and CHFS 2011, total family income is aggregated from a list of items for labor income, net business income, investment income, transfer income, and income from other sources, whereas for CGSS 2010, CGSS 2012, and CLDS 2012, family income is measured by one single question in which the respondent reported total family income in the previous year, which may come from all possible sources. Wherever information on family size is available, Gini coefficients for family income per capita were also calculated and are shown in parentheses. For PPP-adjusted Gini coefficients, incomes are adjusted for differences in cost of living between rural and urban areas and among provinces, which are from the geographic price indices in 2000 reported by Brandt and Holz (33) updated to 2010 using provincial rural and urban inflation rates published by the NBS (34).
How High Is Income Inequality in China Today?

The Gini coefficient is a well-understood measure of inequality (16). Based on the distribution of an outcome variable among ranked-ordered units in a population, the Gini coefficient measures the degree of inequality in the distribution of total resources. A Gini coefficient of 0 expresses perfect equality, with all units receiving an equal share. A Gini coefficient of 1 means maximal inequality where one unit has all of the resources. In Fig. 1, we show our estimates of the Gini coefficient of family income for recent years in China from the seven new sources discussed above, represented by red squares. We also display the Gini coefficient published by Li et al. (17) based on the 2007 survey of the Chinese Household Income Project (denoted by CHIP 2007), which was conducted by the NBS. For official statistics, we use purple triangles to show the Gini coefficients from 2003 to 2012 reported by an NBS official in a press conference in January 2013 (2). It is evident that the Gini coefficients based on independent, university-based surveys uniformly surpass the official figures, especially for the most recent years, i.e., 2010, 2011, and 2012, ranging from 0.530 based on CFPS 2010 to 0.611 based on CHFS 2011.

To provide background, we also present the Gini coefficients for earlier years in black circles, taken from the database of the World Institute for Development Economics Research of the United Nations University (hereafter UNU-WIDER) (18). To ease interpretation, we draw a nonparametric local polynomial regression (LOESS) curve to depict the trends in income inequality in China during the last four decades. For comparison, we also present a LOESS regression curve for the United States in the same period, based on data released by the US Census Bureau (19). Fig. 1 clearly shows that, since the 1980s, the rise of income inequality has been far more dramatic in China than in the United States. According to the smoothed trends, the Gini coefficient in China was around 0.30 in 1980, but by 2012 it had nearly doubled to 0.55, far surpassing the level of 0.45 in the United States.

The rise of income inequality in China has coincided with China’s rapid economic growth since the beginning of the economic reform in 1978. These parallel increasing trends in China’s recent past have caused a large portion of ordinary Chinese to think that an increase in income inequality automatically accompanies economic development and thus is a necessary price for economic growth (4, 13). In both economics and sociology literature, it has also been proposed that the relationship between economic development and income inequality takes the form of an inverted U: inequality first increases in the early stages of development and then declines in the later stages (20–23).

When we examine the empirical pattern across countries between economic development and income inequality using the latest available data, we indeed find the expected inverted U relationship. In Fig. 2, we plot the Gini coefficients for family income in 136 countries between 1995 and 2012 (y axis) against the logarithm of gross domestic product (GDP) per capita (x axis) in these countries in 2012. The data came from the World Factbook released by the Central Intelligence Agency (24). Each green circle in the figure represents a country. The inverted U relationship is shown by a quadratic regression line (dashed line) that was fitted to the cross-national data. We observe that income inequality in the United States is significantly above the level predicted by the fitted curve.

Has China’s recent past followed the upward segment of the general inverted U relationship between economic development and income inequality? To answer this question, we superimpose in Fig. 2 the trend data for China from 1980 to 2012, with a LOESS regression line depicting the relationship between log GDP per capita and Gini coefficient for China over this period. At the same level of economic development (as measured by logged GDP per capita), Fig. 2 shows that China’s increase in Gini has been much faster than what is expected from the regression line estimated from the cross-national data. In fact, China’s Gini continued to grow after it crossed the regression line in 2002, when China’s GDP per capita reached US$2,866, and its Gini reached 0.45. As in Fig. 1, the Gini coefficients for the years before 2005, appearing in black circles, were taken from the UNU-WIDER database. As in Fig. 1, we use red squares to present the Gini coefficients estimated from the eight new sources, including Mini Census 2005 and CHIP 2007. Fig. 2 indicates that the temporal relationship between income inequality and economic development in China in the last three decades has clearly followed a different pattern than what is estimated from the cross-national data, with the former having experienced much faster increases than international comparison would suggest. In the most recent years, although there are still other countries with higher Gini coefficients than China at the same level of economic development, China’s income inequality has far exceeded the average for other countries at similar levels.

Using multiple data sources, we established that China’s income inequality since 2005 has reached very high levels, seen from the perspectives of both China’s past (Fig. 1) and international comparisons (Fig. 2). The next question is what may account for China’s very high levels of income inequality in the post-2005 period. We now turn to regression analyses of microlevel data to understand why income inequality in China has been so high in recent years.

Why Is Income Inequality So High in China?

To aid interpretation, we compare the microlevel structure of income inequality in China with that in the United States, which serves as a reference in this study because its inequality structure has been well studied (12). We pair CFPS 2010 with the March supplement of the Current Population Survey in 2010 (March CPS 2010). These two data sets are fairly comparable because both surveys contain comprehensive measurements of income for each interviewed family, including labor income, net business income, investment income, transfer income, and income from other sources. Total family income is defined as the sum of these items. For each country, we examine the extent to which income inequality is mediated by five explanatory variables: (i) region, (ii) area type, (iii) education, (iv) race/ethnicity, and (v) family structure. We made the measurements of the variables as comparable across the countries as possible. Region is defined as...
China and the United States and compare the corresponding $R^2$s. Because we include only one factor at a time as the independent variable in predicting income, we denote these $R^2$s as bivariate $R^2$s.

We present the bivariate $R^2$ results in Fig. 3, using solid squares for China and hollow squares for the United States. Relative to the United States, income inequality in China is far more explainable by regional disparities and the rural-urban divide (i.e., area type). Specifically, about 12% of the overall income inequality in China can be attributed to differences across provinces, whereas variation across states in the United States accounts for no more than 2% of the overall inequality. Similarly, the rural-urban divide accounts for more than 10% of the total inequality in China, whereas it contributes virtually none in the United States. These results confirm a conclusion drawn in past studies that a large portion of China’s income inequality is attributable to structural forces such as the urban-rural divide and regional variation, both of which have been maintained by political structures in large part to promote economic growth (13, 14, 25, 26). Fig. 3 also shows a notable difference between China and the United States in how income inequality is affected by family structure and race/ethnicity of the family head. Family structure is far more important in the United States, accounting for more than 12% of the total inequality, compared with only 2% in China. This contrast is partly due to a much larger proportion of single-parent families in the United States (7.9% of the US population vs. 1.9% of the Chinese population), which are subject to a significant disadvantage in average income in the United States (see Tables S3 and S4 for detailed statistics). In addition, the role of education is similarly important in China and the United States: in both countries, around 15% of income inequality can be explained by the level of education of the family head.

Robustness Analysis

One drawback of the preceding one-way ANOVA is that it only considered one factor at a time. We know that different determinants of income are correlated and thus share explanatory power in common. For example, in China, education tends to be higher in urban areas than in rural areas and higher in coastal, more developed regions than in inland, less developed regions. Hence, the bivariate $R^2$s from different explanatory variables may be confounded. To corroborate our finding, we resort to multivariate linear regressions. First, we regress logged income on the five explanatory variables together (see Tables S3 and S4).
markedly smaller than the corresponding bivariate family income per capita (i.e., null model) is much higher in China than in the United States. Second, confirming an earlier finding from Fig. 3, region and area type account for a substantial part of income variation in China but not in the United States. As a result, when only these two factors are taken into account, residual inequality is very similar between China and the United States. However, when education is included in the regression model, the size of residual inequality again becomes lower in the United States. Finally, when race/ethnicity and family structure are also factored in, residual inequality is markedly higher in China than in the United States.

Conclusion
The preceding analyses of recently available survey data from China have led us to draw two conclusions. First, China’s income inequality has reached very high levels in recent years, with the Gini coefficient well above 0.50 around 2010: high both from the perspective of China’s past and in comparison with other countries at similar stages of economic development. They are also substantially higher than what has been acknowledged in the government statistics. Second, a substantial part of China’s high income inequality is due to two structural forces at work: a large regional variation and a large gap between rural and urban residents. The contributions of these two structural forces are particularly strong in China, in light of the fact that they play a negligible role in generating the overall income inequality in the United States, where personal-level and family-level income determinants, especially family structure and race/ethnicity, tend to be more important. This pattern, however, should not be taken as unique in today’s China from either a temporal or a comparative perspective. From a temporal perspective, in the prereform era, China’s income distribution was already marked by a large urban-rural divide and vast regional variation. In 1980, the Gini coefficient in urban China was as low as 0.16, but the nationwide Gini coefficient was around 0.3, higher than other socialist economies at that time (28, 29). From a comparative perspective, other large developing or middle-income countries, such as Brazil, India, and Indonesia, also exhibit similar patterns of large regional income disparities (30). For example, about 14–15% of the total inequality in Brazil is attributable to regional differences (31).

In conclusion, our results reveal that China’s income inequality has grown rapidly in the last three decades, to a very high level around 2010. The rapid rise in income inequality can be partly attributed to long-standing government development policies that effectively favor urban residents over rural residents and favor coastal, more developed regions over inland, less developed regions (13, 25, 32). Given the structural importance in generating China’s high income inequality, it seems plausible that income inequality can be reduced by changes in government policies, for example, reducing the rural-urban and regional disparities. We begin to observe early signs of change in this direction between 2010 and 2012 (2).

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for detailed results). Then, we alternately exclude one of the five independent variables from the full model and reestimate the restricted regression, yielding five auxiliary models. To assess the unique contribution of variable $K$, we calculate the partial $R^2$ (27) as
\[
\text{partial } R^2 = \frac{R^2 - R^2_{K}}{1 - R^2_{K}},
\]
where $R^2$ denotes the $R^2$ for the full model, and $R^2_{K}$ denotes the $R^2$ for the model that includes all variables except $K$. Hence, partial $R^2$ gauges the proportion of the remaining variation of logged income that can be explained by variable $K$ when all of the other factors are taken into account. Fig. 3 displays these partial $R^2$s with solid and hollow circles, respectively, for China and the United States. We observe that most partial $R^2$s are markedly smaller than the corresponding bivariate $R^2$s, indicating correlated explanatory power among different determinants of income. However, the main contrasts between China and the United States remain true: (i) compared with the United States, inequality in China is heavily structured by regional variation and the rural-urban divide; (ii) compared with China, inequality in the United States is more influenced by family structure and race/ethnicity of the family head; and (iii) education of the family head is very important in predicting family income in both China and the United States.

To further understand how the five proposed social determinants contribute to income inequality differently between China and the United States, we now examine the levels of residual variance for a set of nested regression models as we progressively add region, area type, education, race/ethnicity, and family structure to the regression model of logged income. The results are shown in Fig. 4, again with solid squares representing China and hollow squares representing the United States. Consistent with results using the Gini measure, the overall variance of log family income per capita (i.e., null model) is much higher in China than in the United States. Second, confirming an earlier finding from Fig. 3, region and area type account for a substantial part of income variation in China but not in the United States. As a result, when only these two factors are taken into account, residual inequality is very similar between China and the United States. However, when education is included in the regression model, the size of residual inequality again becomes lower in the United States. Finally, when race/ethnicity and family structure are also factored in, residual inequality is markedly higher in China than in the United States.

Fig. 4. Residual variances for different models of logged income in China and the United States. The dependent variable is log family income per capita. All regressions were weighted by family size.

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
Explanatory Variables & China & United States & China & United States & China & United States \\
\hline
Null Model & 0.05 & 0.06 & 0.05 & 0.06 & 0.05 & 0.06 \\
Region & 0.02 & 0.03 & 0.02 & 0.03 & 0.02 & 0.03 \\
Area Type & 0.01 & 0.02 & 0.01 & 0.02 & 0.01 & 0.02 \\
Education & 0.01 & 0.02 & 0.01 & 0.02 & 0.01 & 0.02 \\
Race/Ethnicity & 0.01 & 0.02 & 0.01 & 0.02 & 0.01 & 0.02 \\
Family Structure & 0.01 & 0.02 & 0.01 & 0.02 & 0.01 & 0.02 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Residual variances for different models of logged income in China and the United States.}
\end{table}


