

Bayesian sampling in visual perception

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It is well-established that some aspects of perception and action can be understood as probabilistic inferences over underlying probability distributions. In some situations, it would be advantageous for the nervous system to sample interpretations from a probability distribution rather than commit to a particular interpretation. In this study, we asked whether visual percepts correspond to samples from the probability distribution over image interpretations, a form of sampling that we refer to as Bayesian sampling. To test this idea, we manipulated pairs of sensory cues in a bistable display consisting of two superimposed moving drifting gratings, and we asked subjects to report their perceived changes in depth ordering. We report that the fractions of dominance of each percept follow the multiplicative rule predicted by Bayesian sampling. Furthermore, we show that attractor neural networks can sample probability distributions if input currents add linearly and encode probability distributions with probabilistic population codes.

Bayesian inference | neuronal network | neuronal noise | perceptual bistability

There is mounting evidence that neural circuits can implement probabilistic inferences over sensory, cognitive, or motor variables. In some cases, humans can perform these inferences optimally, as in multi-cue or multisensory integration (1–8). For complex tasks, such as object recognition, action perception, and object tracking, the computations required for optimal inference are intractable, which implies that humans must use approximate inferences (9–11). One approximate scheme that is particularly appealing from a biological point of view is sampling. Consider as an example the problem of object recognition. The goal of the inference in this case would be to compute the probability over object identities given the image. Although this probability distribution may be difficult to compute explicitly, one can often design algorithms to generate samples from the distribution, allowing one to perform approximate inference (12, 13). Some human cognitive choice behaviors suggest that the nervous system implements sampling. However, whether the same is true for low-level perceptual processing is currently unknown.

Stimuli that lead to bistable percepts (14–18), like the Necker cube, provide a tractable experimental preparation for testing the sampling hypothesis. With such stimuli, perception alternates stochastically between two possible interpretations, a behavior consistent with sampling as suggested by several works (16, 19, 20). However, the key question is what probability distribution is being sampled. If the brain uses sampling for Bayesian inference, neural circuits should sample from an internal probability distribution on possible stimulus interpretations that are conditioned on the available sensory data, the so-called posterior distribution. This distribution places important constraints on the distributions of perceptual states for bistable stimuli.

To test this idea, we used stimuli composed of two drifting gratings whose depth ordering is ambiguous (21). We then manipulated two depth cues to vary the fractions of dominance of the percepts. Our central prediction is that the fractions of dominance of each percept should behave as probabilities if they are the result of a sampling process of a posterior distribution over image interpretations. We will refer to this form of sampling as Bayesian sampling. First, we show that subjects' fractions of dominance in different cue conditions follow the same multiplicative rule as

probabilities in the Bayesian calculus, suggesting that bistable perception is indeed a form of Bayesian sampling. Second, we describe possible neural implementations of a Bayesian sampling process using attractor networks, and we discuss the link with probabilistic population codes (22).

Results

Multiplicative Rule for Combining Empirical Fractions of Dominance.

We asked subjects to report their spontaneous alternations in perceived depth ordering of two superimposed moving gratings over a 1-min period and measured the fraction of dominance time for each percept (*Methods* and Fig. 1*A*). In the first experiment, the two drifting gratings, α and β , were parameterized by their wavelength and speed. One of the wavelengths was always set to a fixed value λ^* , and one of the speeds was set to a fixed value ν^* . The remaining wavelength and speed parameters, λ and ν , respectively, determined the difference in wavelength and speed between gratings α and β , denoted $\Delta\lambda$ and $\Delta\nu$, and hence, the information for choosing grating α as the one behind. We refer to these differences as the cues to depth ordering, and we refer to the condition where the two differences are zero as the neutral cue condition ($\Delta\lambda = 0$ and $\Delta\nu = 0$). These cues have been shown to have a strong effect on the depth ordering of the gratings because of their relationship with the natural statistics of wavelength and speed of distant objects (21). In the second experiment, we manipulated wavelength and disparity, d , of the gratings. In this case, the label ν should be interchanged with the label d .

According to the Bayesian sampling hypothesis, the empirical fractions of dominance arise from a process that samples the posterior distribution on possible scene interpretations given the sensory input. As we show in *SI Methods*, when two conditionally independent cues are available (i.e., the values of the cues are independent when conditioned on true depth), an optimal system should sample from a probability distribution given by the normalized product of the probability distributions derived by varying each cue in isolation while keeping the other cue neutral. Our hypothesis implies that the empirical fractions should behave as probabilities, and therefore, they should follow the multiplicative rule (Eq. 1)

$$f_{\lambda\nu} = \frac{f_{\lambda}f_{\nu}}{f_{\lambda}f_{\nu} + (1-f_{\lambda})(1-f_{\nu})}, \quad [1]$$

where $f_{\lambda\nu}$ is the fraction of time that subjects report percept A (grating α moving behind grating β) when the cues are set to $\Delta\lambda$ and $\Delta\nu$, f_{λ} is the fraction of dominance of percept A when the speed cue is neutral ($\Delta\nu = 0$) while the wavelength cue has value $\Delta\lambda$, and f_{ν} is the dominance fraction when the wavelength cue is neutral ($\Delta\lambda = 0$) while the speed cue has value $\Delta\nu$. This relation holds whether subjects are sampling from posterior distributions

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


Fig. 1. Cue combination in a perceptually bistable stimulus. (A) The visual stimulus consisted of two superimposed drifting gratings moving in different directions. The perceived depth ordering of the gratings is bistable. We measured the fraction of dominance of each percept by asking subjects to report the perceived depth ordering of the gratings during trials of 1-min duration (hypothetical trial shown). (B) Cue combination. (Upper Left) Fractions of dominance for each depth ordering when wavelength is nonneutral (its value differs between the two gratings), whereas speed is neutral (its value is identical across gratings). (Upper Right) is the same as Upper Left, but when speed is nonneutral, the wavelength is neutral. (Lower) Fraction of dominance when both speed and wavelength are nonneutral. Bayesian sampling predicts that the fraction of dominance when both cues are nonneutral is equal to the normalized product of the fractions of dominance when only one cue is nonneutral (Eq. 1). In the example illustrated here, both cues were congruent.

on depth or posterior distributions raised to an arbitrary power n (*SI Methods*). The multiplicative rule provides an empirical consistency constraint for Bayesian sampling. Note that this rule does not specify how the samples are extracted over time [i.e., it works whether the samples are independent over time (23, 24) or correlated]. As discussed later, bistable perception is only consistent with a sampling mechanism that generates correlated samples (i.e., the percept tends to remain the same over hundreds of milliseconds).

Observed vs. Predicted Fractions of Dominance. The multiplicative rule was tested in two experiments. In the first experiment, the wavelength and speed differences between the two gratings, $\Delta\lambda$ and Δv , were changed from trial to trial congruently [C condition (i.e., both cues favoring the same depth ordering); example in Fig. 1B] or incongruently [IC condition (i.e., the cues favored different depth orderings)]. This change was achieved by decreasing the wavelength and increasing the speed of grating α in the C condition, while decreasing the wavelength of grating α and increasing the speed of grating β in the IC condition. In the second experiment, the wavelength and stereo disparity (instead of speed) of the gratings were manipulated in the C and IC conditions as in the previous experiment.

As shown in Figs. 2 and 3, wavelength, speed, and disparity differences in the gratings have a strong impact on the fractions of dominance of the gratings' depth ordering (21). The fraction of dominance of percept A (grating α is behind grating β) increases as the wavelength difference between gratings α and β ($\Delta\lambda = \lambda_\alpha - \lambda_\beta$) decreases. The fraction increases as the speed difference between gratings α and β ($\Delta v = v_\alpha - v_\beta$) increases in the C condition (Fig. 2A). Conversely, the fraction decreases as the difference (in speed or wavelength) between the gratings decreases in the IC condition (Fig. 2B). In the second experiment, the fraction of dominance of percept A increases as the disparity difference between gratings α and β ($\Delta d = d_\alpha - d_\beta$) increases in the C condition (Fig. 3A). Again, the reverse pattern is observed in the IC condition (Fig. 3B). In the two experiments, when the two cues are set to their neutral values, the fractions (Figs. 2 and 3, black open circles) are not significantly different from one-half [two-tailed t test; experiment 1: $p = 0.39$ (C), $p = 0.06$ (IC) and experiment 2: $p = 0.31$ (C), $p = 0.051$ (IC)].

The experimental results were compared with the theoretical predictions from the multiplicative rule (Eq. 1) (Figs. 2A and B and 3A and B). The predictions when the two cues are nonneutral (Figs. 2A and B and 3A and B, filled blue circles) were

computed using the experimental data of the single nonneutral cue cases only (Figs. 2A and B and 3A and B, open red circles). The case in which wavelength is the only nonneutral cue corresponds to the lower line of open circles in Figs. 2A and 3A and the upper line in Figs. 2B and 3B in both experiments. The cases in which speed (or disparity) is the only nonneutral cue correspond to the vertical line of open circles in the wavelength and speed (or disparity) experiment in Fig. 2B (Fig. 3B respectively). The match between the observed data points (filled red circles) and predictions is tight, even though the multiplicative rule is parameter-free and cannot be adjusted to match the experimental results (note that, for the sake of clarity, the blue dots have been slightly displaced to the right). The data in Figs. 2A and B and 3A and B were replotted in Figs. 2C and 3C to show the predicted fraction of dominance from the multiplicative model vs. the observed fraction when the two cues were nonneutral with the C (Figs. 2C and 3C, light blue dots) and IC (Figs. 2C and 3C, dark blue) conditions combined. The strong alignment of the data points along the unity line confirms that the multiplicative rule provides a tight fit to the data. Individual subjects also followed the multiplicative rule (*SI Methods* and Fig. S1).

We also tested alternative models to the multiplicative rule. In the first model, we assumed that integration between the cues does not take place—a strongest cue take all model. In this model, performance is driven by the cue with the lowest uncertainty: The fraction of dominance when both cues are varied together is set to that of the cue whose fraction when the cues are manipulated alone has the largest absolute value difference with respect to one-half (*SI Methods*). As shown in Figs. 2D and 3D (brown dots) this model fails to capture our experimental results. In the second model, we generated predictions from a realistic neuronal network (see *Results, Sampling with Realistic Neural Circuits*). When the input neurons to the network fired nonlinearly in response to the stimuli (25), the predictions of the model, which fit the single nonneutral cue conditions, substantially differed from the experimental data in the four nonneutral cues conditions (NL net) (Figs. 2D and 3D, orange dots). When the input neurons fired linearly (26), the predictions were identical to the multiplicative rule (L net) (Figs. 2D and 3D, blue dots). This result shows that the mere fact that a network can oscillate stochastically between two percepts in a way suggestive of sampling does not guarantee that it will also follow the multiplicative rule. Whether it does depends critically on how the inputs are combined, a point that we discuss more thoroughly below.




Fig. 2. Experimental and predicted fractions of dominance in the wavelength and speed cue combination experiment. (A) Fraction of dominance of percept A (i.e., grating α is behind grating β) as a function of the wavelength difference between gratings α and β ($\Delta\lambda = \lambda_\alpha - \lambda_\beta$) for three different speed differences ($\Delta v = v_\alpha - v_\beta$) in the congruent condition (both cues favored the same depth ordering). Data are averaged across subjects, and the error bars correspond to SEM across subjects. Experimental observations (red and black) and predictions from the multiplicative rule (blue circles) (Eq. 1) are shown. The predictions from the multiplicative rule were computed using the experimental data from the conditions in which only one cue was nonneutral (open circles). The black open circles correspond to the fractions measured when the two cues were neutral. The predictions are displaced slightly right in relation to the experimental data (filled red circles) to allow better visual comparison. (B) Same as in A but for the incongruent condition (the cues favored opposite percepts). (C) Predicted fractions of dominance for the multiplicative rule combining the data from the congruent (C; light blue) and incongruent (IC; dark blue) conditions from A and B as a function of the empirical fractions. (D) Same as in C but for the strongest cue take all rule (brown) and a rate-based model with nonlinear (orange) and linear (blue) input neurons.

Diffusion in an Energy Model. Our finding that bistable perception behaves like a Bayesian sampling process raises the issue as to how neurons could implement such a process. We first show that implementing the multiplicative rule is surprisingly straightforward with energy models. In *Results, Sampling with Realistic Neural Circuits*, we will present a neural instantiation of this conceptual framework. We model the dynamics of two neural populations, A and B , whose states are described by their firing rates r_A and r_B , respectively (Fig. 4A). The reduced dynamics tracks the difference between the firing rates, $r = r_A - r_B$, where $r > 0$ corresponds to percept A . This variable obeys (Eq. 2)

$$\tau \frac{d}{dt} r = -4r(r^2 - 1) + g(I_\lambda, I_v) + n(t), \quad [2]$$

where $g(I_\lambda, I_v)$ is a bias provided by the inputs and $n(t)$ is a filtered white noise with variance σ^2 (27) (*SI Methods*). The first term on the right-hand side ensures that the activity difference, r , hovers around the centers of the two energy wells (Fig. 4B). The bias term measures the combined strength of the cues, which is a function of the individual strengths I_λ and I_v , favoring percept A from the wavelength and speed cues, respectively. The function $g(I_\lambda, I_v)$ is chosen such that it is zero when the two cues are neutral (zero




Fig. 3. Experimental and predicted fractions of dominance in the wavelength and disparity cue combination experiment. A–D are the same as in Fig. 2 but with speed replaced by disparity.

currents) and positive when the two cues favor percept A (the two currents are positive). The dynamics of Eq. 2 can be viewed as a noisy descent over the energy landscape $E(r) = r^2(r^2 - 2) - g(I_\lambda, I_v)r$, which is symmetrical (Fig. 4B, black line) when the two cues are neutral and negatively tilted (Fig. 4B, gray line) when the cues favor percept A . The resulting dynamics effectively draws samples from an underlying probability distribution that depends on the input currents (a process known as Langevin Monte Carlo sampling) (28).

To model the experimental data that we have described, we need a form of sampling that obeys the multiplicative rule. Whether the network obeys the rule or not depends critically on the function $g(I_\lambda, I_v)$. We consider here the family of functions described by $g(I_\lambda, I_v) = I_\lambda + I_v + \varepsilon(I_\lambda^2 I_v + I_v^2 I_\lambda)$, where ε measures the strength of the nonlinearity. Similar nonlinear functional dependences on the input currents naturally arise in neuronal networks with nonlinear activation functions (*Results, Sampling with Realistic Neural Circuits*).

For a value of ε different from zero, the dynamical system does not follow the multiplicative rule (Fig. 4D). In contrast, if we set ε to zero, such that $g(I_\lambda, I_v) = I_\lambda + I_v$, the system now obeys the multiplicative rule (Fig. 4E). This result can be derived analytically by computing the mean dominance duration of each percept, which corresponds to the mean escape time from one of the energy wells (*SI Methods*). We can then show that the fraction of dominance of population A for ε equal to zero is a sigmoid function of the sum of the inputs (Eq. 3)

$$f_{\lambda v} = f(s = A | I_\lambda, I_v) = \frac{1}{1 + e^{-2(I_\lambda + I_v)/\sigma_{\text{eff}}^2}} \propto e^{(I_\lambda + I_v)/\sigma_{\text{eff}}^2}, \quad [3]$$

where σ_{eff}^2 is the effective noise in the system and is proportional to σ^2 . Note that when only one cue is nonneutral, $f_i \propto e^{I_i/\sigma_{\text{eff}}^2}$ ($i = \lambda, v$), and when both cues are nonneutral, $f_{\lambda v} \propto e^{(I_\lambda + I_v)/\sigma_{\text{eff}}^2}$. Therefore, the fractions are related through $f_{\lambda v} \propto f_\lambda \times f_v$, and after normalization, they follow the multiplicative rule (Eq. 1). Fig. 4F shows that Eq. 3 is indeed satisfied by the diffusion model, because the fraction of dominance of percept A obtained from numerical simulations as a function of the total input current (Fig. 4F, blue line) is a sigmoid function (Fig. 4F, red line). This

tistics of the world is fixed, the optimal solution involves picking the action that is the most likely to be rewarded; however, when the statistics of the world change over the time, sampling from the posterior distribution, which is a form of exploratory behavior (21, 39), is more sensible (40). Interestingly, bistable perception implements a form of sampling that could be used to smoothly interpolate between pure exploration (sampling from the posterior) and pure exploitation (choosing the action that is the most likely to be rewarded). Indeed, our results suggest that bistable perception samples from posterior distributions that are raised to a power, p^n , where n can take any value (*SI Methods*). When n is large, the most likely state is sampled on almost every iteration, which corresponds to exploitation, whereas setting n close to zero leads to exploratory behavior.

The fact that low-level vision and perhaps low-level perception might involve sampling is particularly interesting in light of several other recent findings suggesting that higher-level cognitive tasks, like causal reasoning (41, 42) and decision-making (43), might also involve some form of sampling. Sampling may turn out to be a general algorithm for probabilistic inference in all domains.

Methods

Experimental Methods. The stimulus consisted of two superimposed square-wave gratings, denoted α and β , moving at an angle of 160° between their directions of motion behind a circular aperture (21) (Fig. 1A) with the parameters specified in *SI Methods*. The gratings consisted of gray bars of

equal luminance presented on a white background. Where the gray bars intersected, the luminance was set to that of the bars (as if one of the bars was occluding the other bar). Observers were asked to continually report their percept by holding down one of two designated keys [i.e., motion direction (right or left) of the grating that they perceived as being behind the other grating] and not to press any key if they were not certain. We measured, in each trial, the accumulated time that either percept (i.e., depth ordering) was dominant and computed the fraction of time that percept $s = \{A, B\}$ dominated as $f(s) = (\text{the cumulative time percept } s \text{ was reported as dominant}) / (\text{the total time that either of the percepts was reported as dominant})$. Therefore, this fraction corresponds to the proportion of time that percept s dominated. Percept A denotes the percept in which grating α is behind grating β (and conversely, percept B). Fractions of dominance shown in the figures correspond to averaged values of the fractions across trials and observers, and error bars correspond to SEM across the population.

Mathematical Methods. The derivations of the multiplicative rule and stronger cue take all rule and the descriptions of the energy, rate-based, and spiking models are presented in *SI Methods*.

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