The logic of indirect speech
Edited by Jeremy Nathans, Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine, Baltimore, MD, and approved December 11, 2007
Abstract
When people speak, they often insinuate their intent indirectly rather than stating it as a bald proposition. Examples include sexual come-ons, veiled threats, polite requests, and concealed bribes. We propose a three-part theory of indirect speech, based on the idea that human communication involves a mixture of cooperation and conflict. First, indirect requests allow for plausible deniability, in which a cooperative listener can accept the request, but an uncooperative one cannot react adversarially to it. This intuition is supported by a game-theoretic model that predicts the costs and benefits to a speaker of direct and indirect requests. Second, language has two functions: to convey information and to negotiate the type of relationship holding between speaker and hearer (in particular, dominance, communality, or reciprocity). The emotional costs of a mismatch in the assumed relationship type can create a need for plausible deniability and, thereby, select for indirectness even when there are no tangible costs. Third, people perceive language as a digital medium, which allows a sentence to generate common knowledge, to propagate a message with high fidelity, and to serve as a reference point in coordination games. This feature makes an indirect request qualitatively different from a direct one even when the speaker and listener can infer each other's intentions with high confidence.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS.
We thank Peter Gärdenfors and two anonymous reviewers for comments on an earlier draft. This work was supported by National Institutes of Health Grant R01 HD-18381 (to S.P.).
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© 2008 by The National Academy of Sciences of the USA.
Submission history
Received: July 31, 2007
Published online: January 22, 2008
Published in issue: January 22, 2008
Acknowledgments
We thank Peter Gärdenfors and two anonymous reviewers for comments on an earlier draft. This work was supported by National Institutes of Health Grant R01 HD-18381 (to S.P.).
Notes
This article is a PNAS Direct Submission.
Authors
Competing Interests
The authors declare no conflict of interest.
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