Evolving polycentric governance of the Great Barrier Reef
Edited by Anthony J. Bebbington, Clark University, Worcester, MA, and approved March 8, 2017 (received for review December 19, 2016)
Significance
Global sustainability depends on robust environmental governance regimes. An investigation of the Great Barrier Reef regime between 1975 and 2016 reveals how complex environmental regimes become increasingly structurally dense and eventually reach a point of stabilization. However, structural complexity and stability alone do not necessarily mean the system is robust. Instead, a complex but stable structure can mask exogenous change, which then can generate more endogenous change; this phenomenon has implications for the environmental outcomes of complex regimes. Therefore, it is vital to anticipate and account for change in designing, implementing, and evaluating sustainable environmental governance.
Abstract
A growing field of sustainability science examines how environments are transformed through polycentric governance. However, many studies are only snapshot analyses of the initial design or the emergent structure of polycentric regimes. There is less systematic analysis of the longitudinal robustness of polycentric regimes. The problem of robustness is approached by focusing not only on the structure of a regime but also on its context and effectiveness. These dimensions are examined through a longitudinal analysis of the Great Barrier Reef (GBR) governance regime, drawing on in-depth interviews and demographic, economic, and employment data, as well as organizational records and participant observation. Between 1975 and 2011, the GBR regime evolved into a robust polycentric structure as evident in an established set of multiactor, multilevel arrangements addressing marine, terrestrial, and global threats. However, from 2005 onward, multiscale drivers precipitated at least 10 types of regime change, ranging from contextual change that encouraged regime drift to deliberate changes that threatened regime conversion. More recently, regime realignment also has occurred in response to steering by international organizations and shocks such as the 2016 mass coral-bleaching event. The results show that structural density and stability in a governance regime can coexist with major changes in that regime’s context and effectiveness. Clear analysis of the vulnerability of polycentric governance to both diminishing effectiveness and the masking effects of increasing complexity provides sustainability science and governance actors with a stronger basis to understand and respond to regime change.
Acknowledgments
The author thanks Cindy Huchery and Missaka Hettiararchchi for assisting with the literature review, documentary review, and analysis and presentation of the data; Terry Hughes, Jon Day, Marcus Lane, Graeme Cumming, and Pip Cohen for their helpful comments and suggestions; and project interviewees and key informants. This project received ethics approval from James Cook University (no. H6149) and was supported by the Australian Research Council. An earlier version of this research was presented at the 2016 International Coral Reef Symposium, June 19–24, 2016, Honolulu, Hawaii.
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Cover image: Pictured are African elephants in Serengeti National Park, Tanzania. Matthew G. Burgess et al. assessed the link between harvesting costs and reductions in the range area of animals that are harvested for high-value products, such as elephants, which are poached for ivory. The authors found that if such animals maintain local population densities by reducing their geographic range as the size of their population declines, overharvesting would remain profitable and potentially increase the likelihood of extinction. The findings suggest that incorporating forces that affect range size, such as habitat destruction, climate change, and schooling behavior, would improve modeling assessments of overharvesting threats. See the article by Burgess et al. on pages 3945–3950. Image courtesy of Andrew Dobson (Serengeti National Park, Tanzania).
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Freely available online through the PNAS open access option.
Submission history
Published online: March 27, 2017
Published in issue: April 11, 2017
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Acknowledgments
The author thanks Cindy Huchery and Missaka Hettiararchchi for assisting with the literature review, documentary review, and analysis and presentation of the data; Terry Hughes, Jon Day, Marcus Lane, Graeme Cumming, and Pip Cohen for their helpful comments and suggestions; and project interviewees and key informants. This project received ethics approval from James Cook University (no. H6149) and was supported by the Australian Research Council. An earlier version of this research was presented at the 2016 International Coral Reef Symposium, June 19–24, 2016, Honolulu, Hawaii.
Notes
This article is a PNAS Direct Submission.
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The author declares no conflict of interest.
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